SCHAUER (DO NOT DELETE)

10/13/2020 10:35 PM

Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Abrams Case, and the
Origins of the Harmless Speech Tradition
Frederick Schauer*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE OTHER PARAGRAPH(S) ..................................................... 205
II. THE FACTS ............................................................................................................... 207
III. THE URGE TO TRIVIALIZE .................................................................................... 214
IV. THE “HARMLESS SPEECH” TRADITION .............................................................. 218
V. CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 223
I. INTRODUCTION: THE OTHER PARAGRAPH(S)
For over a century now, abundant attention, almost all of it positive,
has been paid to the magisterial final paragraph of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States.1 It
was here that Holmes observed that “time has upset many fighting
faiths,”2 that “the best test of the truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market,”3 and that the
Constitution “is an experiment, as all life is an experiment,”4 among the
many ideas packed into this one modestly-sized paragraph.
All the praise appropriately lavished upon this paragraph has had
the effect, however, of deflecting attention from the remainder of
Holmes’s opinion. More specifically, the common focus on the final
paragraph has obscured Holmes’s observation four paragraphs earlier
*David and

Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia. This
Article is the written and referenced version of my contribution to the Symposium on
“Abrams at 100: A Reassessment of Holmes’s ‘Great Dissent’” held at the Columbia Law
School on November 8, 2019.
1 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The well-known exception
to my characterization of the attention to Holmes’s Abrams dissent as “positive” is John
H. Wigmore, Abrams v. U.S.: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Thuggery in War-Time
and Peace-Time, 14 ILL. L. REV. 539 (1920), describing the opinion as “poor law” and
“poor policy,” id. at 539, while also describing Abrams and his co-defendants as “alien
parasites.” Id. at 549.
2 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3 Id. The most thorough examination of what Holmes meant and did not mean by
this statement is Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
4 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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that the prosecution was based on “the surreptitious publishing of a silly
leaflet by an unknown man”5 and by his characterization of the leaflets
distributed by Jacob Abrams and his colleagues and co-defendants not
as thoughtful or stirring arguments but as “poor and puny
anonymities.”6
These contemptuous descriptions of Abrams and the writings he
distributed are important but not for the same reason that the lines of
Holmes’s concluding paragraphs are important. Rather, Holmes’s
sneering words are important because they were false and because he
must have known that they were false. Yet by using descriptions that
were as erroneous as they were denigrating, Holmes made things easy
for himself, clearing a smooth path to his conclusion that Abrams’s
utterances should be protected by the First Amendment. And in making
things easier for himself, Holmes also made it easy—too easy—for
subsequent advocates and theorists to evade difficult issues about how
and how much to protect speakers who, like Abrams, are far from silly,
far from unknown, and far from puny. Most importantly, Holmes, by his
disdainful inaccuracies, deflected attention from the central question of
free speech theory—why and how much to protect speech that is by no
means harmless. In dismissing the consequences of the speech that he
wished to protect, and thus reducing the cost of the protection he
advocated, Holmes facilitated a persistent and troubling strand of free
speech argumentation and free speech theory—the view that the First
Amendment protects speech because it is harmless. The First
Amendment does and should protect at least some harmful speech, and
the First Amendment protects speech not because (or when) it is
harmless but despite the harm it may cause.7 It becomes more difficult
to confront when and why that is so, however, if we are lured down the
false path of harmlessness that Holmes helped to blaze a century ago.

Id. at 628.
Id. at 629. It is easy on quick reading to conclude that this was Holmes’s
characterization of Jacob Abrams and his colleagues, but closer examination of the text
makes it clear that Holmes was talking about leaflets and not people, even though he
probably believed it about the people as well. Id.
7 On this framing of one of the central questions—maybe the central question—of
free speech theory, see C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
979, 981, 986–93 (1997). Earlier, see LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982). And, more recently, Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the
First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81; Frederick Schauer, On the Relation Between
Chapters One and Two of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 571 (2011);
Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321 (1992).
5
6
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II. THE FACTS
The time has come, a century later, to compare Holmes’s portrayal
of the Abrams defendants and their speech with reality. And we can
start with Holmes’s characterization of the leafletting as
“surreptitious.”8 Simply put, the characterization is untrue. 5000
leaflets were printed by Abrams himself on an electric printing press,
and 9000 had been printed and distributed earlier by Abrams’s codefendant Mollie Steimer.9 Most of the leaflets were, indeed,
anonymously tossed from the top of a tall building, but it is not as if just
a few were secretly passed in sealed envelopes from one person to
another in a nonpublic setting. Perhaps the leafletting could be called
“surreptitious” in the sense that the leaflets were unsigned or that those
who tossed the leaflets from the rooftop did not advertise their
identities. But the failure of the leafleteers to sign the leaflets or to
identify themselves at the time of the leafletting seems no more
surreptitious than the behavior of a mugger who, having taken his
target’s wallet, runs away without leaving identification.10 By
describing the act as “surreptitious,” however, Holmes appeared to be
suggesting something other than the attempts to avoid detection that
characterize most criminal acts. But to the extent that Holmes was
implying that Abrams’s distribution of the leaflets was both small-scale
and more covert than we see in the mine-run of criminal acts, the
implication fits poorly with the actual facts.

250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., A Contemporary State Trial—The United States versus
Jacob Abrams et al., 33 HARV. L. REV. 747, 750 (1920), with corrections made in Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., A Contemporary State Trial—The United States versus Jacob Abrams et als.,
35 HARV. L. REV. 9, 10–13 (1921). Chafee describes the press only as a “power” printing
press, but a steam-powered press would have been unlikely in the rented Manhattan
(Madison Avenue and 104th Street) basement in which the leaflets were printed.
Chafee, 33 Harv. L. Rev. at 750. And on the importance of self-printing to the anarchists
of the time, see Kathy E. Ferguson, Anarchist Printers and Presses: Material Circuits of
Politics, 42 POL. THEORY 391 (2014).
10 American evidence law is instructive here. Under Rule 609 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, witnesses can be impeached (that is, their credibility questioned) by
evidence of past criminal convictions. Fed. R. Evid. 609. The rule restricts such use to
crimes of substantial seriousness, in particular those punishable by one year or more of
imprisonment. Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). This restriction, however, does not apply to
crimes involving a “dishonest act or false statement,” Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2), but both
the caselaw (see the lengthy discussion in United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 362–65
(D.C. Cir. 1976) and the comments of the Advisory Committee (F.R. Evid. Advisory
Committee’s Note to 2006 Amendment to Rule 609) make clear that simply attempting
to avoid detection does not count as a dishonest act for purposes of the rule.
Analogously, efforts to avoid identification would not seem alone to count as
“surreptitious.”
8
9
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Of greater import is the way in which Holmes, again misleadingly,
sought to trivialize Abrams and his leaflets. The trivialization starts with
Holmes’s characterization of the leaflets as the product of “an unknown
man.” Singular. In fact, Jacob Abrams was one of seven defendants
charged in the indictment, all but one of whom worked together in
creating and distributing the leaflets. One, Jacob Schwartz, died just
before the trial was to commence, possibly as a result of police brutality
in interrogating him, possibly from pre-existing health issues, and
possibly from the 1918–1919 flu epidemic.11 Another defendant,
Gabriel Prober, was acquitted by the jury, the jurors apparently
believing that Prober, although connected with the political activities of
Abrams and the others, had nothing to do with the production or
distribution of the leaflets that provided the basis for the charges.12
Not only was Abrams part of a group of at least five (Prober aside),
but that group also had numerous connections with the substantially
larger and wider movement of militant anarchists and socialists who
were active in New York at the time. Specifically, Abrams and his codefendant Mollie Steimer, as well as the other defendants, were close
colleagues of Emma Goldman, Alexander Berkman, and various other
radical, albeit less well-known (than Goldman and Berkman), anarchist
and socialist activists of the 1890 to 1920 period.13 And although many
members of that larger group were all too often prosecuted and
persecuted for expressing opinions that would be easily and properly
protected by the First Amendment today, and although the notorious
official overreaction to their activities is exemplified by the Palmer
raids14 and what we now call the “Red Scare,”15 other members of this
larger group, and at times the same members, not only actively
encouraged political violence but were also often involved in it.16 At
times justifying violent actions by describing them as propaganda of the
11 See THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS
MIND—AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 178–79 (2013); RICHARD
POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH 88–95
(1987); Zosa Szajkowski, Double Jeopardy—The Abrams Case, 23 AM. JEWISH ARCHIVES 6,
10 (1971).
12 See POLENBERG, supra note 11, at 48, 124–25, 132, 138.
13 Id. at 64, 74, 131–32.
14 See STANLEY COBEN, A. MITCHELL PALMER: POLITICIAN (1963).
15 See generally BEVERLY GAGE, THE DAY WALL STREET EXPLODED: A STUDY OF AMERICA IN
ITS FIRST AGE OF TERROR 119–20 (2009); ANN HAGEDORN, SAVAGE PEACE: HOPE AND FEAR IN
AMERICA, 1919 (2007); ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1919–
1920 (1955); WILLIAM PRESTON, JR., ALIENS AND DISSENTERS: FEDERAL SUPPRESSION OF RADICALS,
1903–1933 (1963); DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 352 (1997).
16 See generally RICHARD BACH JENSEN, THE BATTLE AGAINST ANARCHIST TERRORISM: AN
INTERNATIONAL HISTORY, 1878–1934 (2014).
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deed,17 this loose coalition of largely immigrant New York-based
anarchists and socialists18 was implicated in no small number of
bombings and other violent acts. Alexander Berkman, to take the most
prominent example, served fourteen years in prison for attempting to
assassinate—the law called it simply “attempted murder”—Henry Clay
Frick in 1892 and was likely at the center of politically-motivated
bombings in 1913 and 1915.19 Emma Goldman was almost certainly a
co-conspirator with Berkman in the Frick episode,20 sympathized with
but did not assist (police and public opinion to the contrary) in the
assassination of President William McKinley in 1901,21 and until (and
after) she was deported in 1919 frequently spoke about the necessity of
violence in support of the anarchist cause.22 And although the larger
group that included Berkman, Goldman, and the Abrams defendants was
comprised substantially of Jewish immigrants from Russia and Eastern
and Central Europe, that group also had many connections with the
Galleanists, the followers of the Italian anarchist Luigi Galleani.23 The
Galleanists, also predominantly New York based, and possessing a zeal
that outstripped their bomb-making skills, were responsible for
numerous bombings from 1915 to 1920, some of which proved fatal to
some Galleanists and bystanders, even if never to the targets.24

17 The phrase and its variants (“propaganda by the deed” and “propaganda and the
deed,” most commonly) had nineteenth century European origins, and was adopted by
many of the American anarchists. See generally Dan Colson, Propaganda and the Deed:
Violence and the Representational Impulse, 55/56 AM. STUDIES 163 (2017); Steve Fraser,
Propaganda of the Deed, 31 LONDON REV. BKS 4 (February 26, 2009) (reviewing EMMA
GOLDMAN, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN YEARS (2008)); Marie Fleming,
Propaganda By the Deed: Terrorism and Anarchist Theory in Late Nineteenth Century
Europe, in TERRORISM IN EUROPE 8 (Yonah Alexander & Kenneth A. Myers eds., 1982); Mark
Shirk, The Universal Eye: Anarchist “Propaganda of the Deed” and Development of the
Modern Surveillance State, 63 INT’L STUDIES Q. 334 (2019).
18 A coalition, at least according to my father, that included my grandfather Nandor
Schauer, who died from influenza at the tail end of the 1918–1919 epidemic. Even had
he lived, there is no indication that he was important or influential enough to have
attracted the attention of the authorities.
19 See GAGE, supra note 15, at 56–61; JAMES MCGRATH MORRIS, REVOLUTION BY MURDER:
EMMA GOLDMAN, ALEXANDER BERKMAN, AND THE PLOT TO KILL HENRY CLAY FRICK (2014).
20 See GAGE, supra note 15, at 59; MORRIS, supra note 19.
21 EMMA GOLDMAN, LIVING MY LIFE 223 (1931).
22 See GAGE, supra note 15, at 37, 103–04, 351 n.5. See generally GOLDMAN, supra note
21; KATHY E. FERGUSON, EMMA GOLDMAN: POLITICAL THINKING IN THE STREETS (2011).
23 See PAUL AVRICH, SACCO AND VANZETTI: THE ANARCHIST BACKGROUND 48–57 (1991);
GAGE, supra note 15, at 207–11; Jeffrey D. Simon, The Forgotten Terrorists: Lessons from
the History of Terrorism, 20 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 195, 195 (2008).
24 GAGE, supra note 15, at 207–58; ROBERT TANZILO, THE MILWAUKEE POLICE STATION
BOMB OF 1917 (2010). See generally Adam Quinn, Chronicling Subversion: The Cronaca
Sovversiva as Both Seditious Rag and Community Paper, 3 RADICAL AMS. 1 (2018).
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I do not mean to suggest in any way that Abrams and his codefendants were guilty of even what they were charged with, especially
because the charges, and those doing the charging, seemed unable to
distinguish among support for the Russian Revolution, opposition to the
Russian Revolution, communism, socialism, anarchism, Bolshevism,
pacifism, and opposition to the First World War. The various “isms”
were lumped together by Attorney General Palmer, much of the press,
and much of the public, and there can be little doubt that the leaflets,
which supported the Russian Revolution and explicitly condemned
German militarism, were treated as if they were simply another version
of the anti-war and anti-conscription activism that characterized the
likes of Charles Schenck,25 Eugene Debs,26 and Jacob Frohwerk.27 Nor is
any of the above to be taken as suggesting that the Abrams defendants
had anything even faintly resembling a fair trial, particularly because
Judge Henry Clayton (of Clayton Antitrust Act fame) plainly stifled even
the most reasonable of defense requests and motions, thus ensuring that
a guilty verdict would be the outcome.28 Most importantly, none of the
above should be understood as suggesting that any of the Abrams
defendants should have in any way been held responsible for the
violence urged and sometimes committed by Berkman, Goldman, the
Galleanists, and various others.
These disclaimers are important, but they should not detract from
the fact that Abrams was decided, and Holmes’s dissent was written,
during a period of widespread and highly visible political violence, some
of it anarchist, some of it socialist, some of it inspired by trade unions,
and some of it in the service, even if slightly earlier, of various forms of
anti-war and anti-conscription radical activism. And although Abrams
and his co-defendants in the Abrams case should not be held responsible
for the violent activities of those with whom they acquainted, with
whom they collaborated in advocacy, and with whom they shared goals
and political commitments, I do intend to paint a picture of the political
and social environment of the times that diverges from the impression
that Holmes wanted to create. Part of this divergence, to repeat, comes
from Holmes’s attempts to portray Abrams as a lone dissenter or even
as part of a very small group of out-of-the-mainstream cranks—the
lunatic fringe, as it were. In this, however, Holmes was taking liberties
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); see also Jill Lepore, Eugene V. Debs and
the Endurance of Socialism, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 18, 2019.
27 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919). On Frohwerk and his case, see
Frederick Schauer, Every Possible Use of Language?, in THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY 33
(Geoffrey R. Stone & Lee C. Bollinger eds., 2019).
28 HEALY, supra note 11, at 176–80; POLENBERG, supra note 11, at 82–117.
25
26
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with the truth. Of course, Abrams alone could not have started a
revolution, initiated a general strike, or done any of the other things the
fear of which prompted his prosecution. But nor could any single
person, or even a group of seven, have started the American, French, or
Russian revolutions, initiated the rebellion and secession of the
Confederate states, prevented American entry into the First World War,
or secured the vote for women. All of these events required collective
and accumulative action, and to single out any very small number of
actors as solely responsible for the production of collective action,
including collective harms as well as collective benefits, is to fail to
recognize that many events, harmful or not, are the consequence of
aggregate actions by multiple agents. Holmes knew this well,29 and his
implicit claim that Abrams and his immediate colleagues alone could not
have caused massive social disruption, while true, is to set up a straw
that was easy—too easy—to knock down.
Consequently, a more accurate picture of the era, and thus a more
faithful picture of what was widely feared at the time, would certainly
have included the fact that the Yiddish version of the leaflets called for a
general strike during a time of war.30 And the picture would also include
a wide range of other violent events that had taken place in recent years.
Among these events were, for example, general strikes across 1917–
1918 in Springfield, Illinois; Kansas City, Missouri; Waco, Texas; and
Billings, Montana, these following the more than 3,000 strikes that took
place between April and October of 1917 alone.31 In addition, the West
Virginia Coal Wars—with “war” hardly being hyperbolic—commenced
in 1912 and continued in 1918 and 1919,32 and although the very
lengthy Paterson Silk Strike of 1913 was largely nonviolent, it too
resulted in two deaths.33 Accelerating racial violence directed against

29 Of some relevance here is Holmes’s longstanding awareness of how strikes and
other large social movements get started, an awareness exemplified in his early and
anonymously published comment on the British Gas Stokers’ Strike. See Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., Summary of Events: Great Britain: The Gas-Stokers’ Strike, 7 AM. L. REV. 582
(1873).
30 POLENBERG, supra note 11, at 51–55.
31 See Paul Michel Taillon, Labour Movements, Trade Unions and Strikes (USA),
1914-1918 ONLINE INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR (Feb. 26, 2017),
https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/labour_movements_trade_unions_
and_strikes_usa?version=1.0.
32 See DAVID CORBIN, LIFE, WORK, AND REBELLION IN THE COAL FIELDS: THE SOUTHERN WEST
VIRGINIA MINERS, 1880–1922 (2d ed. 2015). See generally ELLIOTT J. GORN, MOTHER JONES:
THE MOST DANGEROUS WOMAN IN AMERICA (2001); Hoyt N. Wheeler, Mountaineer Mine Wars:
An Analysis of the West Virginia Mine Wars of 1912–1913 and 1920–1921, 50 BUS. HIST.
REV. 69 (1976).
33 See STEVE GOLIN, THE FRAGILE BRIDGE: PATERSON SILK STRIKE, 1913,
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African Americans throughout 1919 led to the characterization of the
middle of that year as “Red Summer,”34 and the years from 1915 to 1920
were perhaps the period of the greatest degree of Industrial Workers of
the World (I.W.W.)-inspired activism, some although not much of which
was violent35 but which produced considerable violent retaliation by
state and local authorities.36 Similarly, the Boston police went on strike
on September 9, 1919, just over a month before the Abrams argument,
producing “several nights of chaos” in which the state’s National Guard
had fired into a crowd to restore order.37 And although the Centralia
Massacre did not take place until a day after the Abrams decision was
delivered,38 it too emphasizes that the period before, during, and
especially after American entry into the First World War was marked by
a degree of political and social unrest and violence not seen since.
Especially given the confluence of the just-described labor unrest, the
Russian Revolution and its aftermath, the flu epidemic,39 and the violent
retaliation and repression of the Red Scare, it is hard to imagine anyone

at 104, 180 (1988); ANN HUBER TRIPP, THE I.W.W. AND THE PATERSON SILK STRIKE OF 1913
(1987).
34 See DAVID F. KRUGLER, 1919, THE YEAR OF RACIAL VIOLENCE: HOW AFRICAN AMERICANS
FOUGHT BACK (2014); CAMERON MCWHIRTER, RED SUMMER: THE SUMMER OF 1919 AND THE
AWAKENING OF BLACK AMERICA (2011); MARTIN W. SANDLER, 1919: THE YEAR THAT CHANGED
AMERICA 65–94 (2019).
35 See PAUL FREDERICK BISSENDEN, THE I.W.W.: A STUDY OF AMERICAN SYNDICALISM (1919).
The I.W.W. was widely believed at the time to be far more violent than it was, a belief
partly fostered by the rhetoric of its leaders, and even more by the rhetoric of anti-labor
activists and public officials. See Joseph R. Conlin, The I.W.W. and the Use of Violence, 51
WISC. MAGAZINE OF HIST. 316 (1968). Much, however, turns on the definition of “violent.”
If “violence” is restricted to direct physical harm to people, then the I.W.W. can plausibly
be taken at its word in cautioning “against violence.” RABBAN, supra note 15, at 79. But
if “violence” includes the form of “sabotage” that involves the destruction of property,
id., then understanding the I.W.W. as non-violent is misleading. The most prominent
I.W.W. figures were founding member William (Big Bill) Haywood, a victim of Red Scare
excesses who fled to the Soviet Union in 1920; Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, also an activist
for women’s rights and one of the founders of the American Civil Liberties Union; and
Joe Hill, whose almost certainly unjustified Utah murder conviction and execution in
1915 not only inspired a century of folk songs, legends, and fictional accounts but was
also likely itself the cause of numerous violent protests.
36 See MELVYN DUBOFSKY, WE SHALL BE ALL: A HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE
WORLD (2d ed., 1988).
37 See FRANCIS RUSSELL, A CITY IN TERROR: CALVIN COOLIDGE AND THE 1919 BOSTON POLICE
STRIKE (1975); STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: A LIFE IN WAR, LAW, AND IDEAS
389 (2019).
38 The Centralia Massacre, as it is commonly labeled, took place on the first Armistice
Day (now Veterans Day), November 11, 1919. See generally TOM COPELAND, THE CENTRALIA
TRAGEDY OF 1919: ELMER SMITH AND THE WOBBLIES (2011).
39 See SUSAN KINGSLEY KENT, THE INFLUENZA PANDEMIC OF 1918–1919: A BRIEF HISTORY
WITH DOCUMENTS (2013).
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being unaware of the fact that officials and the public were living in a
period convulsed by exceptional violence and death.40
The appropriate punctuation mark to all of the foregoing comes
from two episodes of organized bombings directed against officials and
other prominent Americans just several months before Abrams was
argued. On April 29, 1919, at least thirty-six bombs were sent,
apparently by several Galleanists and designed to explode on May 1, to
a wide swath of prominent Americans, including Albert Burleson, the
Postmaster General; A. Mitchell Palmer, the Attorney General; Federal
Judge Kennesaw Mountain Landis, soon to become Commissioner of
Baseball; several governors, senators, and members of the House of
Representatives; and, most relevantly, Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr.41 Although some of the bombs did explode and
cause injury, most of them, including the one intended for Holmes, were
intercepted before delivery.42 On June 2, however, nine substantially
larger bombs were sent and successfully delivered, one causing the
death of a night watchman and several more causing various other
injuries to staff members of the intended recipients.43 These bombs, one
of which was again addressed to Attorney General Palmer, were also
addressed to prominent officials, including, again relevantly, Boston
state judge Albert Hayden and Massachusetts Congressman Samuel
Leland Powers, both of whom, especially the latter, likely traveled in the
same social and intellectual circles as Holmes.44
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing highly abbreviated
account of the 1918–1919 American social and political environment
should be plain. Fear of political violence was widespread, and even
though the reactions against it were excessive and oppressive, the fears
were hardly without basis. And as the intended recipient of one bomb
and the acquaintance of other intended and actual recipients, Holmes,

See HEALY, supra note 11, at 117, also noting the New Year’s Eve bombings in
Philadelphia, a conspiracy to assassinate President Woodrow Wilson, “violent plots to
overthrow the government in Seattle, Chicago, and Pittsburgh,” and the Boston molasses
explosion, which was probably not caused by political agitators, contemporaneous
opinion to the contrary. See STEPHEN PULEO, DARK TIDE: THE GREAT BOSTON MOLASSES FLOOD
OF 1919 (2003).
41 See AVRICH, supra note 23, at 140–56, 181–95; HEALY, supra note 11,
at 132–34; MURRAY, supra note 15; POLENBERG, supra note 11, at 162.
42 See sources cited in note 41, supra.; see AVRICH, supra note 23, at 142.
43 Id.
44 Id. That Hayden and Powers were targets makes it even clearer that Holmes, even
though not one to read the daily newspapers, could not have been unaware of the
bombings. And that is so even apart from the fact that one of the undelivered bombs
was addressed to him.
40
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although not a reader of the daily newspapers,45 could not have been
unaware of the widespread presence of actual and intended political
violence in the United States. 46 And equally obviously, Holmes was too
smart and too perceptive not to have recognized that speeches, leaflets,
and meetings all played a significant role in the spread and organization
of this actual and intended violence, as well as other events of actual and
intended substantial disruption, including general strikes and industrial
sabotage. That Holmes’s trivialization of Abrams and his colleagues
departed in important ways from the state of affairs that actually existed
throughout the country at the time, and that Holmes must have been
aware of the departure, is the fairest conclusion to be drawn. That
conclusion, however, invites the question of why, to which I now turn.
III. THE URGE TO TRIVIALIZE
So what might have led Holmes to trivialize the Abrams defendants
and their potential impact? One possibility is that the trivialization
simply reflected Holmes’s views about death. As a thrice-wounded Civil
War veteran, at least once gravely so, Holmes tended to view death with
equanimity, almost as a matter of chance.47 Such a view would hardly
be surprising for any survivor of the Civil War, given the inevitability of
widespread and almost random death in the mass charges that
characterized much of the fighting in that war. In downplaying the
dangers that might come from the extensive advocacy of large-scale
political violence, therefore, Holmes may simply have been reflecting his
own perspective on life and death.48
A second possible explanation for Holmes’s underestimation of the
risks created by the militant anarchist, socialist, and trade union
activism of the time is that Holmes was seeking to compensate for the
widespread exaggeration of those risks. Although that exaggeration
existed throughout the First World War, and even earlier, it accelerated
dramatically after the April 28 and June 2 bombings in 1919, partly, and
not surprisingly, because Attorney General Palmer was himself a target
45 See David H. Burton, The Curious Correspondence of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
and Franklin Ford, 53 NEW ENG. Q. 196, 201 (1980).
46 BUDIANSKY, supra note 37, at 387.
47 On Holmes’s fatalism, and its likely cause in Holmes’s Civil War experiences and
injuries, see G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 49–
86 (1993). See also David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint,
44 DUKE L.J. 449, 469 (1994).
48 Never having myself confronted the possibility of imminent death, except
actuarily, I offer no views on how Holmes (or anyone else, for that matter) might react
to having had such confrontations on multiple occasions.
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of both of those bombing attempts.49 So although the dangers were real,
so too was the official exaggeration of them.50 The dangers of anarchist
and related violence plainly existed, but those dangers were neither as
probabilistically great nor as temporally immediate as Attorney General
Palmer, his chief subordinate J. Edgar Hoover, most other officials, much
of the media, and most people believed and portrayed.51 To the extent
that Holmes was genuinely concerned with the widespread
exaggeration of the dangers, and it is pretty clear that he was,52 he may
well have thought it crucial to downplay the dangers as a way of
attempting to counteract what he might have perceived as an unjustified
panic exacerbated by the government and accepted by the public.
But perhaps there is something more to Holmes’s trivialization of
Abrams and the efforts of those like him than merely Holmes’s fatalism
and his possible desire to counteract a government-fueled hysteria. To
explore what this something more might be, we must start with
Holmes’s initial decision to dissent and thus his conclusion that Abrams
and his co-defendants should not have been convicted. Moreover, and
as has been amply documented,53 Holmes had also decided that the First
Amendment would motivate this conclusion. Assuming that Holmes
had initially concluded that the First Amendment required reversal of
the Abrams convictions, he then faced two options. He could have
acknowledged that the Abrams defendants were indeed dangerous54 but
See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
Thus, Holmes may have been engaging, sub silentio, in the kind of risk analysis of
free speech problems urged in Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics,
Biases, and Institutions in the First Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2003).
51 See Allan L. Damon, The Great Red Scare, 19 AMERICAN HERITAGE, Feb. 1968,
at 22–27, 75–77; see also MURRAY, supra note 15; SANDLER, supra note 34, at 95–118;
GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798
TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 220–26 (2004).
52 See BUDIANSKY, supra note 37, at 387, 460.
53 See HEALY, supra note 11; see also David S. Bogen, The Free Speech Metamorphosis
of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97 (1982).
54 It is intriguing to speculate about the standard that Holmes used to evaluate the
extent of the danger. Under what later came to be understood as rational basis scrutiny,
see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938), see generally Dana
Berliner, The Federal Rational Basis Test—Fact and Fiction, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 373
(2016), a standard arguably inspired by the acceptance of Holmes’s dissent in Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), Holmes could have concluded
that legislative determinations about the dangers of advocacy of a certain type,
determinations embodied in the 1918 amendment to the Espionage Act of 1917, were
entitled to substantial deference. Indeed, such a conclusion might be seen as underlying
the toothless version of clear and present danger that Holmes applied in Schenck, Debs,
and Frohwerk. By implicitly rejecting this approach in Abrams, however, Holmes could
be seen as paving the way for what we would now consider heightened scrutiny, see
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1278–79 (2007); Tara
49
50
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then argued that the First Amendment nevertheless protected their
dangerous activity.55 Alternatively, Holmes could have argued that the
Abrams defendants were simply not dangerous at all, making restriction
of their speech pointless at the outset, with the First Amendment being
the receptacle for the conclusion that an empirically pointless
prosecution could not be upheld.
The language that Holmes used to describe the Abrams defendants
plainly supports the latter explanation. And, interestingly, so too does
much of what we know about the psychology of human decisionmaking. Although a great deal of our lives involves negotiating
conflicting goals, desires, reasons, and principles, doing so is often a task
that is as unpleasant as it is difficult. In order to make the task easier
and reduce the unpleasantness, hardly a surprising motivation, we turn
out to be prone to conceptually define or empirically perceive one of the
choices in such a way as not to conflict, or at least to conflict less, with
the other.56 The label for the well-known phenomenon, a label often
overused or misused by people who know little more than the label, is
cognitive dissonance, and it is one of the more longstanding and most
durable experimental findings in cognitive and social psychology.57
A possible locus of cognitive dissonance, and thus of people’s desire
to seek cognitive consistency,58 is the tension between protecting
Leigh Grove, Tiers of Scrutiny in a Hierarchical Judiciary, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 475
(2016), even of legislative factual determinations, for restrictions of constitutional
rights in general, and First Amendment rights in particular. See Thomas Healy,
Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 704–13 (2009).
55 For the argument that Holmes did precisely this—that he created “a privilege to
cause harm”—but shouldn’t have, see Steven J. Heyman, The Dark Side of the Force: The
Legacy of Justice Holmes for First Amendment Jurisprudence, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
661, 707 (2011).
56 For my own analysis of the phenomenon, with examples from various legal and
constitutional topics, see Frederick Schauer, Rights, Constitutions and the Perils of
Panglossianism, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 635 (2018).
57 Dissonance theory is ordinarily associated with the findings, originally, in LEON
FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957), and further developed in LEON
FESTINGER, CONFLICT, DECISION, AND DISSONANCE (1964); Leon Festinger, Some Attitudinal
Consequences of Forced Decisions, 15 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 389 (1959). Also among the
earlier sources is J.W. Brehm, Postdecision Changes in the Desirability of Alternatives, 52
J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 384 (1956). For more recent overviews and evaluation, see JOEL
COOPER, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: FIFTY YEARS OF A CLASSIC THEORY (2007); Elliot Aronson, The
Return of the Repressed: Dissonance Theory Makes a Comeback, 3 PSYCH. INQ. 303 (1992).
58 On cognitive consistency, the desire of people to avoid cognitive dissonance and
thus to look for agreement and coherence between conflicting beliefs, see generally
ROBERT P. ABELSON, THEORIES OF COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY: A SOURCEBOOK (1968); BERTRAM
GAWRONSKI & FRITZ STRACK, COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY: A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE IN SOCIAL
COGNITION (2012); Bertram Gawronski & Skylar M. Brannon, What is Cognitive
Consistency, and Why Does It Matter?, in COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY: REEXAMINING A PIVOTAL
THEORY IN PSYCHOLOGY 91 (Eddie P. Harmon-Jones ed., Am. Psychol. Ass’n 2019). But for a
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someone or something and believing that the person or thing we are
protecting is dangerous. Concretely, therefore, it is at least plausible,
especially in 1919,59 that protecting speech and believing it dangerous
would be seen as inconsistent and, even more concretely, that
protecting Abrams and his leaflets while also believing them dangerous
would therefore be seen as inconsistent. The remedy for this, for
someone who believed that Abrams and the other defendants should
not be convicted and for someone unwilling (or not yet conceptually
empowered) to argue that harmful speech should be protected by the
First Amendment, is thus to insist that the speech was not in fact
harmful, reasonable views to the contrary notwithstanding.
If we accept, as I have tried to show, that Holmes’s portrayal of the
potential harms of the defendants and their leaflets was at least
somewhat misleadingly understated, then the three possibilities I have
just suggested—relative imperviousness to danger because of his own
experiences, counteracting what he perceived as government
overreaction to anarchist and socialist violence, and the search for
cognitive consistency between constitutional immunity and the degree
of danger of the immunized conduct—offer themselves as possible
explanations. And without the ability to peer into Holmes’s mind a
century after the fact, and more than eighty years after his death, there
is no way to settle on which of these—or others—might have been the
actual explanation. This, however, is about the possible causes of
Holmes’s characterizations of the Abrams defendants. Yet perhaps of
even greater import is the question of the consequences of those
characterizations.

skeptical dissent, see Arie W. Kruglanski et al., Cognitive Consistency Theory in Social
Psychology: A Paradigm Reconsidered, 29 PSYCH. INQ. 45 (2018).
59 Recent and not-so-recent cases have highlighted the First Amendment’s
protection of likely harmful speech. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709
(2012) (protecting intentional factually false statements by a local board member in a
public meeting); Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011)
(protecting violent interactive video games); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)
(protecting display of homophobic signs at a military funeral); United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460 (2010) (protecting the sale and possession of videos depicting animal
cruelty); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (protecting advocacy of violence
against African-Americans and Jews). But such applications of the First Amendment
were far in the future in 1919. Indeed, it may well be that Brandenburg and Ocala Star
Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971) (protecting plainly damaging and plainly
factually false libel), are the first Supreme Court cases applying the First Amendment to
protect uncontroversially harmful speech.
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IV. THE “HARMLESS SPEECH” TRADITION
Holmes’s decision to write a dissenting opinion in support of the
Abrams defendants, and thus to depart from his less speech-protective
conclusions in Schenck, Debs, and Frohwerk, has been so welldocumented60 that it need not be rehearsed here. But having made the
decision to dissent, and having decided to do so on First Amendment
grounds, it was still open to Holmes to choose just how to characterize
the defendants and their speech. One option would have been to
describe with slightly greater accuracy than he actually did the milieu in
which Abrams and the others operated. But if Holmes had faithfully
depicted the environment of fear described above, he would then have
faced the formidable task, especially formidable in 1919,61 of explaining
why the Constitution and the First Amendment should provide special
protection for potentially harm-causing behavior.62 And whether
Holmes avoided that formidable task because of the desire for cognitive
consistency between protection and harmlessness or whether instead
the avoidance was a function of the fact that neither Holmes nor the
world of free speech theory yet possessed the theoretical resources to
make that case, he still chose the characterization that made the task far
less formidable. In doing so, however, he also made things too easy for
theorists and advocates in the ensuing century, theorists and advocates
who seem to have been only too eager to embrace the harmless speech
tradition.
Speech can harm. The time-honored “sticks and stones may break
my bones, but names can never hurt me” mantra notwithstanding,
words (and pictures) possess the manifested capacity to produce a
range of psychic, emotional, and more concrete injuries. Some of those
injuries are direct, and the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, even though now tightly constrained by First Amendment
doctrine,63 embodies the idea that being the target of words and images
60 BUDIANSKY, supra note 37, at 390–95; HEALY, supra note 11; POLENBERG, supra note
11, at 197–242.
61 See supra notes 53 and 59.
62 The now-classic statement of the basic idea is in Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of
Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 204 (1972): “[O]n any very strong version
of the doctrine [of freedom of expression] there will be cases where protected acts are
held to be immune from restriction despite the fact that they have as consequences
harms which would normally be sufficient to justify the imposition of legal sanctions.”
On the idea of special protection for speech, and not simply thinking of free speech as an
instantiation of a broader principle of general liberty, see Frederick Schauer, Free Speech
on Tuesdays, 34 L. & PHIL. 119 (2015); Frederick Schauer, On the Distinction Between
Speech and Action, 65 EMORY L.J. 427 (2015).
63 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46 (1988). See generally David Crump, Rethinking Intentional Infliction of Emotional
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may produce feelings of distress equivalent to or greater than some of
the distresses produced by physical contact. And some speechproduced injuries are mediated by listeners or viewers who respond to
speech by causing harm even while not themselves being the victims of
it. In particular, the harms coming from advocacy or incitement are
mediated harms of this variety. If any of the Klansmen who heard
Clarence Brandenburg’s speech had proceeded, inspired by that speech,
actually to commit acts of “revengeance” against African Americans and
Jews,64 it would be hard to deny that the Brandenburg’s speech had
caused harm, even though the harm was mediated by the listeners and
their subsequent conduct.
This is not the occasion to delve any more deeply into the ways that
speech can harm, in part because I have done so on previous occasions65
and in part because that vast topic, in its full vastness, is neither the
focus of this Article nor of the event that inspired it—commemorating
the Abrams dissent. But noting that speech can harm is important here
because of the longstanding tradition of denying the harm-producing
capacities of speech, a tradition that I want to label the “harmless speech
tradition.” And it is a tradition that may owe much, although the
causation is far from clear, to the language that Holmes used in Abrams
to characterize the defendants and their speech.
The view that speech, especially the speech that is worthy of
protection, is harmless, and thus protected because it is harmless, comes
in many versions.66 The crudest version, of which the “sticks and
stones” adage is emblematic, presumes that the kind of mental distress
often caused by words is different in kind and lesser in degree than the
kinds of harms caused by physical injury. Of course, being shot is more
harmful than being called, say, selfish, rude, unfashionable, or a bad
golfer. But being the target of a racial epithet—or being reminded by an
Distress, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 287 (2018); Elizabeth M. Jaffe, Sticks and Stones May Break
My Bones But Extreme and Outrageous Conduct Will Never Hurt Me: The Demise of
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims in the Aftermath of Snyder v. Phelps,
57 WAYNE L. REV. 473 (2011); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress Tort, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 300 (2010).
64 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 (1969).
65 See Frederick Schauer, Expression and Its Consequences, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 705
(2007); Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81;
Frederick Schauer, The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm, 103 ETHICS 635 (1993)
[hereinafter Schauer, The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm].
66 I put aside the claim that speech is protected only when it is harmless, see generally
Jan Narveson, Freedom of Speech and Expression: A Libertarian View, in FREE EXPRESSION:
ESSAYS IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 59 (W.J. WALUCHOW ED., 1994), and I do so because that view,
its philosophical merits and demerits aside, maps so poorly with American First
Amendment doctrine.
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epithet of one’s physical or mental deficiencies—may, for some people,
produce more mental anguish than being pushed to the ground or
slapped in the face, both of which can be the basis of criminal and civil
liability.67 And if it is the case that some speech-produced mental
distress is greater than the pain or mental anguish produced by some
forms of physical contact, or, for that matter, greater than some financial
losses, then the question is whether there is reason to believe that
speech is systematically less harmful than the remainder of human
action. Indeed, although some have made exactly this claim,68 it is
difficult to see how it could be supported. It is, of course, true that most
speech is harmless, but it is also true that most nonspeech conduct is
harmless. And whether the subset of conduct (or action) that is speech
is more or less potentially harmful than the subset that is not speech—
whether the category of largely harmless speech is larger or smaller,
absolutely or proportionately, than the category of largely harmless
conduct—is simply an assertion that can neither be proved nor denied.
The version of the harmless speech claim to which I have just
alluded is the claim in its least plausible version. Slightly more plausible
is the version of the claim that aims to deny, often by distinguishing
harm from “mere” offense,69 the harms that may ensue when listeners,
observers, or readers suffer some form of distress by virtue of what they
read or hear or observe.70 The basic idea, which is captured, I hope, by
my comparison of being slapped in the face with being the target of an
epithet, is that sometimes people feel distress when they are so
targeted.71 The question, then, is whether this distress is necessarily or
67 On a slap in the face as actionable, see, for example, Leger v. Delahoussaye, 464
So. 2d 1, 4 (La. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Althof, No. B155550, 2002 WL 31303535, at 4
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (citing People v. Rocha, 479 P.2d 372 (Cal. 1971)).
68 “[W]e could reasonably decide that speech is less likely to cause direct or
immediate harm to the interests of others . . . than is purely physical conduct . . . .”
MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 19 (1984) (footnote
omitted). “It is almost certainly true in the overwhelming majority of cases that speech
is less immediately dangerous than conduct.” Id. at 19 n.48. See also Michael Bayles,
Mid-Level Principles and Justification, in 28 NOMOS 49, 54 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1986). For other examples and analysis, see Schauer, The Phenomenology
of Speech and Harm, supra note 65.
69 A powerful challenge to the distinction between harm and offense is Larry
Alexander, Harm, Offense, and Morality, 7 CAN. J.L. & JURISP. 199 (1994). But if the
distinction between harm and offense is fragile, then this fragility might lead to
Alexander’s conclusion that the merely offensive ought not to be regulated. But it also
might lead to the opposite conclusion that the label “offense” is often tendentiously
attached to regulable harms.
70 See David S. Han, The Mechanics of First Amendment Audience Analysis, 55 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1647, 1660 (2014).
71 If the distress is unaccompanied by any significant or lasting pain, then it is not
clear why being painlessly slapped can ground a cause of action, which it can, while
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systematically less consequential than the kinds of physically produced
distresses that are routinely understood to justify legal sanctions.
In response to claims of this kind of distress, a common maneuver
is to attribute the distress to some weakness on the part of the target.
The targets are being “thin-skinned,” so it is said,72 and it is not as if
being the target of an epithet or insult is really, truly, or genuinely
harmful. One branch of the harmless speech tradition, therefore,
focuses on the claims of direct injury and insists that those injuries are,
if not nonexistent, at the very least rare and typically exaggerated.
Another branch of the harmless speech tradition focuses on
mediated harms, as described above—that is, harms caused by a
listener (or reader) and not directly by the speaker. With respect to
such mediated harms, the harmless speech tradition can be further
subdivided into three subbranches. One of the subbranches, and the one
of least interest here, implicitly acknowledges the causation between
the speech and some subsequent act but denies that there is anything
harmful in the subsequent act. Even if it is true, for example, as
nineteenth-century English obscenity law supposed, that sexually
explicit imagery caused teenage boys to masturbate, it is, to put it mildly,
hardly clear that there is anything to worry about in the ultimate
conduct, the views of Victorian England (and late nineteenth-century
United States) notwithstanding.73 And thus, the objection to obscenity
law, whether in nineteenth-century or modern versions, is sometimes
just the objection to an official concern about the conduct portrayed or
encouraged, apart from the question of whether the images did or did
not increase the incidence of the conduct.74 In the context of cases like
being (physically) painlessly insulted face to face cannot. So, too, with spitting. If
someone spits in my face and the spittle makes contact with my skin, I have suffered an
actionable battery. But if the spittle misses, I have no legal remedy, even though the
injury in the former case is mostly (questions of disgust aside) a function of my having
been insulted.
72 Often. See, e.g., RODNEY SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS (1986) (entitling an entire chapter
“The Thinning of American Skin”); Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, Speech Narcissism,
70 FLA. L. REV. 839, 848 (2018); Donald E. Lively, Fear and Media: A First Amendment
Horror Show, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1071, 1090 (1985); Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert,
Columbine Fallout: The Long-Term Effects on Free Expression Take Hold in Public Schools,
83 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1113 (2003).
73 See NOEL PERRIN, DR. BOWDLER’S LEGACY: A HISTORY OF EXPURGATED BOOKS IN ENGLAND
AND AMERICA 164, 251 (1969); FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 7–8 (1976).
74 See, e.g., EDWARD DE GRAZIA & ROGER K. NEWMAN, BANNED FILMS: MOVIES, CENSORS AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 135, 287 (1982). Generalizing from the example in the text, it may
be that at least some objections to extremely sexually explicit images in films, books, and
magazines are objections based on the premise that the proliferation of such images will
increase the incidence, societally, of nonprocreative sex, sex outside of marriage, or
unconventional sexual practices. The basic point is that the empirical question of
causation should not be confused with the normative evaluation of what is caused.
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Schenck, therefore, this subbranch of the harmless speech tradition
might acknowledge that there was a causal relationship between
Schenck’s anti-conscription advocacy and the incidence of draft
resistance but that the draft itself was either immoral or unnecessary.
The speech would be considered harmless, therefore, because the
conduct it produced was not itself harmful.
The second subbranch of the harmless speech tradition when
applied to mediated harms is one that seeks to deny the causal
relationship. For example, the debate in Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Ass’n75 between Justice Scalia for the majority76 and Justice
Breyer, dissenting,77 was about the existence of (or the evidence for the
existence of) a causal relationship between violent interactive video
games and the incidence of violent conduct. Unlike the contexts just
described, in which the acts allegedly caused by speech are argued not
to be harmful at all, here there was no claim that murder, rape, or grand
theft were harmless activities. Rather, this subbranch of the harmless
speech tradition is manifested in a denial of the causal relationship
between the speech and some category of uncontroversially harmful
conduct. This debate has surfaced for generations in the context of
claims that images of a certain sort affect, in the aggregate, the societal
levels of sexual violence,78 nonsexual violence,79 cigarette smoking,80 or
alcohol consumption.81 The denial of the empirical causal relationship
also seems implicit in Holmes’s characterization of Abrams and the
group’s pamphlets, where Holmes appears to deny that what Abrams

564 U.S. 786 (2011).
Id. at 787–802.
77 Id. at 840 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
78 For my own stunningly unsuccessful attempt to clarify some of the issues, see
Frederick Schauer, Causation Theory and the Causes of Sexual Violence, 1987 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 737 (1987).
79 For one side of these debates, see KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY:
LIMITING THE MEDIA’S FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION (1996). For the other side, empirically,
doctrinally, and normatively, see, for example, Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N. Berman,
Regulating Violence on Television, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1487 (1995); L.A. Powe, Jr., American
Voodoo: If Television Doesn’t Show It, Maybe It Won’t Exist, 59 TEX. L. REV. 879 (1981).
80 Compare, e.g., Jon P. Nelson, Cigarette Advertising Regulation: A Meta-Analysis, 26
INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 195 (2006) (questioning the existence of causation), with Joe B. Tye,
Kenneth E. Warner & Stanton A. Glantz, Tobacco Advertising and Consumption: Evidence
of a Causal Relationship, 8 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 492 (1987) (finding causation).
81 Compare Leslie B. Snyder, Frances Fleming Milici, Michael Slater, Helen Sun &
Yuliya Strizhakova, Effects of Alcohol Advertising Exposure on Drinking Among Youth, 160
ARCH. PEDIATR. ADOLESC. MED. 18 (2006) (finding causation), with John E. Calfee & Carl
Scheraga, The Influence of Advertising on Alcohol Consumption: A Literature Review and
an Econometric Analysis of Four European Nations, 13 INT’L J. ADVERT. 287 (2015) (finding
no causation).
75
76
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and his colleagues urged would have an effect on behavior.82 And for all
of these examples, and many more, the harmless speech tradition is one,
Madison Avenue notwithstanding, that can be understood as denying
the causal relationship between the speech and the conduct.
Thirdly, some commentators will acknowledge the harmfulness of
the ultimate conduct, and the causation between the speech and that
conduct, but will seek to attribute the responsibility to the downstream
actor and not to the upstream speaker. Even if Clarence Brandenburg
did cause some of his fellow Klansmen to commit acts of violence against
African Americans and Jews, for example, the responsibility should be
attributed to the listeners as “rational” agents with the capacity to
decide what to do and not to the speakers nor the speech, mediated as
it is by the autonomous decision-making capacities of the listeners.83
There is much more to be said about these various branches and
subbranches of the harmless speech tradition. In the context of this
Article and this Symposium, however, the basic points are that this
tradition exists, that it was close to nonexistent before 1919, and that it
is presented in bold form in Holmes’s Abrams dissent. This is not to say,
nor do we have good evidence for saying, that the Holmes opinion was
causally responsible, for good or for ill, for the subsequent development
and growth of the harmless speech tradition. Still, the praise that the
opinion attracts, and the frequency with which Holmes’s
characterization of Abrams and his speech is quoted to support a claim
of harmlessness, not only support the inference that Holmes was an
early adopter of the harmless speech tradition but also suggests that the
Abrams dissent was potentially a causal agent in the subsequent growth
of a tradition that is now as influential as it is widespread.
V. CONCLUSION
There are various explanations for why Holmes might have
referred to Jacob Abrams as an “unknown man” and why Holmes would
have referred to the leaflets that formed the basis for the prosecution as
“puny anonymities.” One explanation, of course, is that these
characterizations were true. But I have tried to suggest here that such
an explanation may be open to question. And if that is so, then the
82 Abraham Lincoln apparently thought otherwise. “Must I shoot a simple-minded
soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him
to desert?” Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and others (June 12, 1863),
in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859–1865, 454, 460 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989). And so
did the Holmes of Schenck.
83 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Banning Hate Speech and the Sticks and Stones Defense,
13 CONST. COMMENT. 71 (1996); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational
Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 813 (2010).
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various alternative explanations I have offered here may shed light on
why Holmes employed characterizations that seem, at the very least, to
involve excess trivialization of the defendants and their activities.
Holmes’s trivialization of Abrams and his leaflets can thus be seen
as one of the initial landmarks in the harmless speech tradition. And in
helping to launch the harmless speech tradition, Holmes may himself
have contributed to still another harm—the harm of believing that
speech is harmless.

